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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JAMES CARLOS FOOTE,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS;
PETE HAUN, Chairman of the
Utah Board of Pardons; and
VICTORIA PALACIOS, Member of
the Utah Board of Pardons,

No. 9000132

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF

This reply brief is in response to the Respondents' Brief
filed August 31, 1990 by the Assistant Attorney General.

Since

the Attorney General has raised several items not addressed in
Petitioner's opening brief, these matters will first be
discussed.

Next, the original arguments made by Petitioner in

his opening brief will be reiterated in light of the state's
response.
DISCUSSION OF INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL CONTAINED
IN RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Respondents have outlined in general the policies and
procedures of the Utah Board of Pardons.
pp. 7-15).

(Respondents' Brief,

Generally, Petitioner does not disagree with these

statements since they are elementary principles of administrative
law and describe the role that the Board of Pardons is to play in
-1-

the correction system.

Several statements made by the

respondents, however, do require comment.
First, the Board of Pardons lists numerous factors to be
taken into account in deciding whether an inmate should be
paroled.

(Respondents1 Brief, p.

10)-

It is unknown where this

list originated since there is apparently nothing in writing
giving any criteria by which the Board of Pardons chooses to
release or retain an inmate.

Certainly, this type of listing of

criteria should be made available to the inmate who must appear
before the Board.

As noted in the prior brief of Petitioner, at

the present time there is virtually no notice of what standards
will be utilized in determining whether an inmate will be
released.

(Petitionees Brief, pp.

32-33).

If the criteria

listed by the Board of Pardons ift its brief is in fact the
criteria utilized by it during the inmate proceedings then a
permanent regulation should be implemented.
Next, the respondents state that in the interview of October
4, 1985, "Had Mr. Foote made such a request [to see his record]
he would have been provided with access to certain portions of
the file.

Additionally, the portions he was not allowed access

to would have been fully summarized and presented to him at the
interview on October 4, 1985."

(Respondents' Brief, pp. 11-12).

This same statement is made concerning the February 24, 1988
hearing and the February 10, 1989 hearing.
pp. 12-13).

(Respondents1 Brief,

The Board of Pardons fails to note that Mr. Foote

was never advised during any of these proceedings that he would
be allowed to look at his file as is evidenced by the notices of
-2-

the hearings contained in the Appendix to Petitioner's original
brief.

Moreover, had he made such a request only the barest

minimum of information would have been given to him since
everything which is vital to Mr. Foote f s hearing has been
classified as "confidential." Finally, Petitioner knows of no
procedure in which the Board of Pardons has ever summarized
information excluded from an inmate.

There is nothing in the

regulations concerning such procedure and to Petitioner's
knowledge this has never been done with any inmate.
Moreover, the statement contained in Respondents' brief
concerning Foote's access to his file is directly contradicted by
a letter dated October 17, 1989 from Kent M. Barrie, Assistant
Attorney General, to Petitioner's attorney.

That letter (a copy

of which is contained in the Appendix to this Brief) states the
following:
Parole Board files are classified under the
Archives and Records Services and Informations
Practices Act. Some of the information contained
therein is "public", some is "private" and some is
"confidential". See, §63-2-59, et seq. of the Utah
Code. Inmates are not allowed to review their
parole files and this position policy has withstood
attack in the federal courts. If you are
interested in some case law in this area, see,
Gerrish v. Palacios, 87-C-0826A (D. Utah 1987) ;
aff'd on appeal by the 10th Cir., Case No. 88-1443
(March 1, 1989).
(Emphasis added).
Later in the brief the Board of Pardons once again
reiterates that "it will provide a detailed synopsis of those
materials at any interview involving the offender" if the Board
views the material as having an influence upon the decision
making process.

(Respondents' Brief, p.
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15). Again, Petitioner

has no knowledge of such a policy and has had no indication in
the past from the respondent or its attorneys that such a
procedure has been or will be utilized.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO
THE DISTRICT COURT.
The Board of Pardons contends that this matter should be
directed to a district court rather than to this Court.
(Respondents1 Brief, pp. 16-19).

The Board argues that the

district court provides a better forum in which to mediate the
dispute between Mr. Foote and the Board.

The Board contends that

an evidentiary hearing is necessary in order to examine various
aspects of Petitioner's claim including the potential impact a
writ of mandamus would have upon the Board of Pardons, offenders,
the Department of Corrections and individuals who supply
information to the Board of Pardons.

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

18-19).
The position taken by the Board is incorrect.

This Petition

for Mandamus is focused upon the issue as to whether an inmate at
the Utah State Prison is entitled to any due process right during
a parole hearing.

The position previously taken by the Board of

Pardons has been flatly that he or she is not.

If this Court

determines as it should that inmates do have a due process right
under federal or state constitutional law then the question as to
what process is due may require an evidentiary basis.

However,

this question only becomes relevant after the matter of law as to
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due process rights has been ruled upon by the state's highest
court.
If it is determined that inmates do have due process rights
then this Court can decide as a matter of law what rights and
procedures are available to an inmate appearing before the Board
of Pardons.

In the alternative, this Court can require the Board

of Pardons to formulate new policies and procedures subject to
this Court's approval or to require a master or district court to
conduct hearings to establish such procedures.

In any event,

however, the fundamental issues of due process must be decided
initially before any time is spent as to the exact boundaries
that due process requires.
The Merrihew, Crest, and Anderson cases relied upon by the
Board in its brief (Respondents' Brief, p.
inapplicable to the instant case.

19) are completely

In those cases litigants

attempted to circumvent statutory avenues of direct appeals from
administrative decisions by filing writs of mandamus or
prohibition.

Here, there is no statutory avenue for judicial

review of Board decisions and in fact there is a specific statute
stating that no appeal can be taken as to the merits of a parole
board decision.

Here, it is not the merits of the decision which

is being attacked but the procedure claimed under constitutional
law.
As a final note it should be added that Petitioner in his
initial brief contended that a factual hearing may be required
specifically on the issue of due process and the employment of
the victim's mother with the Department of Corrections.
-5-

(Petitioner's Brief, p.

32).

In this context a factual hearing

may be appropriate to the determine what effect if any the
mother's employment with the Department of Corrections has had
upon the Board decisions, upon the Board records, or upon any
other facet effecting Petitioner's parole request.

These matters

of inquiry if required are especially appropriate for a
factfinder which is ultimately responsible to this Court for
review.
POINT II
A WRIT OF MANDAMUS MAY PROPERLY BE
ISSUED BY THIS COURT IF IT FINDS THAT
THE BOARD OF PARDONS HAS SUBSTANTIALLY
VIOLATED AN INMATE'S RIGHT OR THAT SUCH
PROCEDURE IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
The Board attempts to limit the power of this Court to issue
a writ of mandamus only in those instances where it has found the
Board of Pardons has "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion."

(Respondents' Brief, pp. 19-20).

While it is true

that this Court certainly has the power to issue a writ for the
basis stated by the Board of Pardons, it can also do so when
constitutional rights have been infringed upon or when a decision
is capricious and arbitrary.

The very citation of Wright

Development, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, (Respondents' Brief, p.
20) supports this contention.
Aside from the authorities previously cited by Petitioner
(Petitioner's Brief, p.

7) a statement from the Supreme Court of

Indiana is also useful in defining the role of this review.
There, the Court stated:
It is true that there is no right to an
-6-

appeal, in the usual sense, from the decision of
the Parole Board, but Due Process requires that
judicial review be available to insure that the
requirements of Due Process have been met and that
the Parole Board has acted within the scope of its
powers* Murphy v. Indiana Parole Board, 397
N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979).
Thus, this Court is empowered both by its own rules and by
common law to insure that bodies such as the Board of Pardons
fully comply with the requirements of state and federal due
process.

A writ of mandamus it the appropriate remedy when an

adjustment is required.
POINT III
THE PAROLE HEARINGS CONDUCTED BY THE
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS ARE SUBJECT
TO DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION.
It comes as no surprise that the State relies upon the
Greenholtz majority opinion as well as a number of federal
district and appellate cases to argue that there is no liberty
interest created under Utah law which gives rise to a federal due
process right.

(Respondents' Brief, pp. 20-21).

Petitioner

himself admitted that the statutory language alone under these
previous decisions would preclude a finding of a protected
liberty interest.

(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 15-16).

Aside from the statutory language, however, Petitioner
argued that the parole guidelines universally utilized by the
courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the Parole Board do
in fact create a federal liberty interest.
pp.

17-23).

(Petitioner's Brief,

The discussion concerning guidelines is focused

solely upon the federal due process argument and in no way
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relates to state due process since Petitioner believes that the
minority position in Greenholtz should be adopted by this Court
in a state due process analysis.

While ,they may be applicable

also to state due process Petitioner does not believe that it is
necessary to reach this question because of the clear
establishment of a parole system giving rise to a state due
process expectantcy.

The Board of Pardons has, therefore,

misconstrued this argument by stating that the parole guideline
argument is being utilized by Petitioner in both the federal and
state context,

(Respondents1 Brief, pp.

24-25).

As to the guideline argument the State has completely failed
to address the issues raised by Petitioner.

For example,

Petitioner concedes that the guidelines are not mandatory in
determining the length of time that a sentence should be served.
(Respondents1 Brief, p.

25). However, the purpose of the

guidelines is to establish a fair and universal system of
punishment so that persons committing the same crime with the
same background can expect the same type of sentence.

These

guidelines are extensively relied upon by the prosecutor, defense
attorney, and trial judge in deciding whether to enter pleas or
in the sentencing process.
Respondents argue that if the sentencing guidelines were
mandatory courts would be obligated to follow them even though a
court may believe that a defendant deserves a longer or shorter
sentence.

(Respondents' Brief, p.

25). As a practical matter a

Utah trial judge closely follows the guidelines even though he or
she may have difficulty in accepting the guideline sentence.
-8-

Under the federal system it is well known that district judges
are frequently required to impose federal guideline sentences
even though they believe the sentences should be more severe or
less harsh*

Again, however, the purpose of the guideline is to

try to establish a system of fairness so that a defendant in one
county does not receive a sentence which is four times more than
a similar defendant convicted in another county.
Admittedly, the Board of Pardons has other factors to
examine besides the initial sentencing guidelines.

Nevertheless,

when an inmate enters the penetentiary especially based upon a
guilty plea as in the instant case the inmate is entitled to
expect that the guideline will be basically followed unless some
other factor such as poor behavior in prison requires a different
sentence.

It is fundamentally against federal due process to

represent to a defendant that the guidelines will approximate the
sentence if a plea is entered and then to basically state after
incarceration that the guidelines really don't mean anything and
the Board of Pardons is free to do anything it wishes.
At the very minimum, federal due process would require that
in the cases where the guidelines have been exceeded that the
Board of Pardons must then employ a due process standard in order
to allow the inmate the opportunity to contest the increased
sanctions.

(See, Petitioner's Brief, pp. 21-22).

Finally, Petitioner acknowledges that under federal law many
court decisions have found that no due process right exists based
upon peculiarities of the state statutory or regulatory system.
A majority of the string citations relied upon by the state
-9-

reject federal due process based upon the statutory enacting
power of a parole system.
fn.

(See, Respondents' Brief, pp.

22-23,

4 ) . None of these cases rejecting federal due process in

parole proceedings have focused upon state sentencing guidelines
but instead have relied almost exclusively upon the language of
the statutory enacting legislation.

Thus, the mere creation of a

state guideline system has created a justified expectancy on the
part of defendants and inmates which gives rise to a federal due
process standard.
POINT IV
UTAH STATE "DUE PROCESS" CREATES A
LIBERTY INTEREST IN THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS GIVING RISE
TO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
The respondents contend that the language in the Utah
Constitution in which the word "may" is utilized conclusively
establishes the absence of any state due process right.
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 21-22).
without merit.

This argument is completely

Obviously, the Constitution is not going to

require a board of pardons in every case to remit findings and
forfeitures, commute punishments and grant pardons after
conviction.

All boards of pardons must be given some discretion

in reviewing the incarceration of an inmate or there would hardly
be any point in having such a board.

The mere fact that the Utah

Board of Pardons has discretion in deciding the term of
incarceration of an inmate, however, does not mean that the Board
is free from applying any due process procedures in those
proceedings.

The two arguments simply do not follow each other.
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The Board of Pardons contends that "each court that has
considered the question of whether Utah offenders have a right to
early release have answered in the negative." (Respondents'
Brief, p.

22). A review of these cases, however, shows that

this Court has never specifically addressed the state due process
argument in the context of the parole proceeding.
In Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984) this Court cited
the Greenholtz opinion in stating that -before a parole date had
been established an inmate has no constitutional right to be
placed on parole.

Id. at 66.

State due process was never argued

in that case as to the general rules of parole nor specifically
as to whether an interest is created when a parole date has been
established.

It is interesting to note, however, that this Court

followed the U.S.

Supreme Court decision which has held that

inmates are entitled to procedural due process rights in prison
disciplinary proceedings for alleged flagrant or serious
misconduct.

It seems strange that the federal courts are anxious

to apply due process standards and to create a "liberty" interest
as to inter-prison disciplinary problems but refuse to find such
an interest when it relates specifically to an inmates freedom
from incarceration.

This inconsistency does not have to be

adopted under the Utah Constitution.
The Hatch, Allen, Dock, and Houtz decisions (Respondents1
Brief, pp.

23-24) are all based upon an analysis of the Utah

statutory language as applied to federal due process requirements
under the Greenholtz decision.

None of these decisions relate to

state due process requirements.
-11-

The Board of Pardons has not addressed the arguments raised
by Petitioner in his opening brief that state due process should
follow the dissenting opinion in Greenholtz rather than relying
entirely upon the words contained in statutory enactments of
parole board systems.

(Petitioner's Brief, pp.

23-28).

Further

argument as to why the dissenting Greenholtz opinion should be
adopted is therefore unnecessary.
POINT V
STATE AND FEDERAL DUE PROCESS REQUIRES
THAT THE UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS
EMPLOY A NUMBER OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
AT THE TIME OF PAROLE HEARINGS TO INSURE
THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED PROTECTION
IS AVAILABLE.
A.

Impartial Hearing.

The respondents have made no argument in rebuttal to
Petitioner's claim that he is entitled to a hearing before an
impartial board of pardons.

(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 30-32).

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how such a rebuttal could be
argued in good faith.

As noted earlier in this Brief if there is

any factual determination that needs to be made in this case it
would be what effect the employment of the victim's mother with
the Department of Corrections has had upon the previous Board
decisions.

At the very minimum, this Court should order the

Board of Pardons to convene members who have no personal
acquaintance with this lady and to provide a method of insuring
that the staff members of the Board of Pardons who review and
assist in the preparation of the hearing have no personal
relationship with this lady.

Certainly, all inmates are entitled
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to a completely fair and unbiased decision-making board even if
that board is vested with great discretion.
B.

Notice of Parole Criteria,

Petitioner maintained in his earlier brief that due process
requires that the inmate be given timely notice of the hearing as
well as criteria that will be used by the Board of Pardons in
determining parole.

(Petitioner's Brief, pp.

32-34).

The

respondents have listed a number of factors which are allegedly
taken into account in determining whether parole will be granted.
(Respondents1 Brief, pp.

27-28).

This extensive list, however,

is not contained in any regulation or other document available to
the inmates.

Instead, the inmate is instructed only to bring

written information that he wishes the board to consider.
Appendix to Petitioner's Brief.

See

Thus, the inmate is given no

criteria as to what the Board of Pardons will be considering
during the hearing.

It seems elementary that any person

appearing before any administrative board or tribunal is entitled
to know the scope of the proceedings and what is expected of him
in order to be victorious.

This is simply not the case under the

existing system.
The cases relied upon by the State are not applicable to the
arguments raised by Petitioner.

In Murphy v. Indiana the court

relied entirely upon the federal due process Greenholtz analysis
in concluding that no written criteria was required in any
decision.

Likewise, in Shirley v. Chestnut the Tenth Circuit

Court of Appeals found that no due process requirements existed
under the federal Greenholtz criteria and therefore did not even
-13-

address the adequacy of any criteria.
It is submitted that the dissenting Greenholtz opinion is
persuasive in holding that if due process is required in parole
hearings that one of the fundamental procedural safeguards is to
advise an inmate of the criteria of review.

The State has not

refuted this contention.
C.

Access to File.

As a main contention in this proceeding Petitioner has
claimed that he is entitled to access of his file so that he may
examine those documents which the Board bases its decision upon.
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 34-44).

The respondents have disputed

this contention in a number of interesting ways.
Brief, pp. 29-36).

(Respondents1

First, they again have cited several cases in

which a liberty interest has not been found thereby eliminating
any right of due process in accessing information.

Schuemann

v. Colorado State Board of Adult Parole and Candelaria v.
Griffin cited in Respondents1 brief.
Next, Respondents rely upon cases in which a liberty
interest has been found but where the courts find that the board
of pardons may withhold some information for cause.

See

Coralluzzo v. New York State Parole Board, Tasker v. Mohn,
Williams v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, and Thompson
v. New Jersey State Parole Board all cited by the respondents.
Thus, they concede that information should be given to the inmate
unless the board can justify its exclusion.

Under the present

procedures of the Board of Pardons, however, no effort has been
made to devise a system in which some information is given to an
-14-

inmate and other information is withheld.

At the present time

essentially all useful information is categorically withheld in
each and every hearing.

By declaring such information as

"confidential" the inmate is denied access.
In the Thompson v. New Jersey State Parole Board case
Respondents claim that the "court approved the non-disclosure"
of certain types of records." (Respondents1 Brief, p 33). As was
noted in Petitioner's opening brief concerning this same decision
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 41-43) the New Jersey Appellate Court
did not simply allow this designation by the Department of
Corrections to control.

Rather, it created a system of judicial

review in which the Board of Pardons must now designate whether
information which was not disclosed to the inmate was utilized in
the decision making process to deny parole.

In such a case then

a court is entitled to review that information to see if it was
properly withheld.

See 509 A.2d at 251-52.

Thus, all of these cases have required some judicial
involvement in the method of selection as to what records will be
withheld or in a method as to reviewing the propriety of
withholding that information.

In the instant case, the Board of

Pardons has had no standards as to what information it will allow
an inmate to see and what information it will not.

One may ask

after reviewing the list of documents that an inmate may not see
(Respondents' Brief, p.

15) what exactly is left in the file?

The Respondents claim, "Upon request, an offender is
permitted to access his file as set forth above.

He then has the

opportunity to present his position regarding the information in
-15-

the file at the time of any interview before the Board of
Pardons." (Respondents' Brief, p.

35). This statement is again

contrary to the statement of the assistant attorney general
contained in the Appendix and is illusory since an inmate is not
allowed to examine any meaningful information in his file and
therefore is unable to present any position with regard to the
withheld information.
Nest, Respondents contend that the presentence decisions of
this Court are distinguishable since the sentencing phase of a
criminal trial "impacts upon fundamental constitutional
interests." Respondents then argue that whether an offender
should be given an early release date does not involve a
constitutional interest.

(Respondents1 Brief, p.

this response begs the question.

34). Again,

If this Court finds that there

is a sufficient liberty interest either under federal or state
constitutional requirements then a parole hearing does impact
upon fundamental constitutional interests.

If there is no

liberty interest in a parole hearing then the question of access
to files becomes moot.
The Board also argues that the parole hearing is not
adversarial and that "the offender is not faced with an
opponent." (Respondents1 Brief, p.
contradicted by reality.

34). This again is

In many gearings the victims of the

crime are present and the passionately argue that the inmate
should not be released upon parole.

Even in cases where the

victim is not physically present the presence of letters from
alleged victims, prosecutors, judges, and police urging the
-16-

retention of an inmate certainly creates an opposing force.
Here, Mr, Foote was continually confronted with a barrage of
accusations from unknown sources concerning alleged unindicted
crimes.

This situation is therefore much worse than in a trial

setting since a defendant can confront his accusers.
Finally, the fact that an inmate must work with some of the
people evaluating him or the fact that the prison is "sometimes a
cruel and violent place" does not justify a complete policy of
withholding of information.

While there may certainly be

instances where it would not be advised for an inmate to see
certain reports contained in the file these are no doubt rare
instances just as in the case of presentence reports.
Furthermore, anonymous hearsay letters sent to the Board should
receive no protection whatsoever.
The present system provides no screening procedure
whatsoever.

It arbitrarily denies access to all information

utilized by the Board in its decision regardless of any
justification that may be present to deny some access.

As noted

earlier, the repeated references in the respondents' brief as to
a summary of omitted material being supplied to inmates simply
does not occur under the present system and even if it did would
not be satisfactory in providing a balanced safeguard for inmate
access.
Either the Board of Pardons must devise a system which is
fair in allowing inmates access to their files or this Court must
limit the scope of examination that a Board of Pardons can make.
It therefore becomes a decision as to whether to provide an
-17-

inmate with some type of access to unsubstantiated hearsay
allegations or to simply require that the Board of Pardons not be
allowed to look at such information if it was not originally
contained in the presentence report upon which the inmate's
sentence is based.

One way or the other, an inmate is entitled

to relief under the present system.
D.

Opportunity to Refute

Respondents have made no attempt to address Petitioner's
original argument (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 44-49) and therefore
no additional comment is necessary.
E.

Written Decision Detailing
the Reasons for Denial of Parole.

This contention of Petitioner (Petitioner's Brief, pp.
49-51) has only been briefly touched upon by the respondent.
(See Respondents' Brief, pp.

28-29, fn.

6). While the Board of

Pardons contends that its records are sufficient to allow the
"Board" to review its previous decisions, are sufficient to allow
a "member of the public" to review the decision and are
sufficient to allow the "judiciary" to review the decision it
says nothing about the inmate himself.

The regulations of the

Board of Pardons specifically requires that the inmate be
notified in writing and that an explanation of the reasons for
the decision be given in writing.

This simply is not done as a

matter of practice and the inmate has no written documentation as
to how he or she can improve their chances of release for the
next hearing.

Minimal due process requires at least a cursory

explanation for withholding liberty for periods as long as two to
-18-

three years before the next hearing,
CONCLUSION
If the Board of Pardons indeed has over 4,000 offenders
under its jurisdiction (Respondents1 Brief, p. 9) then the
decision in this case will affect a substantial number of
individuals each and every year for many years to come.

It

flies in the face of reality to claim that prison inmates have no
expectancy of release based upon the state guidelines of
incarceration or that they have no expectancy of release by the
mere creation of a parole system which may release them many
years before the end of their sentence.

There is hardly any

situation imaginable in which a "liberty" interest is being
affected more than incarceration in a state prison.

For this

reason, therefore, minimal due process protection should be
afforded to the thousands of individuals who are now under the
jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons.
Assuming this liberty interest to exist Petitioner has
attempted to assist the Court in formulating a due process
standard by which the Board of Pardons should follow.
Admittedly, there are many areas of procedure which have several
alternative methods to comply with due process.

It may well be

as the respondents contend that an evidentiary hearing is
required by a factfinder before some of these procedures can be
sufficiently established.

In any event, however, these inmates

of the penal institution deserve something substantially more
than they are now receiving under the present system which openly
denies any legal protection for continued incarceration and even
-19-

violates the written policies formulated by the Board of Pardons.
In conclusion, the remedy in this case may be difficult to
formulate but difficulty has never stopped this Court from making
tough decisions.

Clearly, the protection of minimal rights for

these inmates is certainly no less deserving than matters
affecting taxation, Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1990) or other extremely
complex areas of litigation.
For these reasons the Writ of Mandamus should be granted and
appropriate relief should be entered.
Respectfully submitted,

Craig S. Cocflfc
Attorney for Petitioner
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of the foregoing Reply Brief to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney
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November, 1990.
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October 17, 1989

Craig Stephens Cook
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Rei

84109

Carlos James Foote - Inmate No. 17242

Dear Mr. Cookt
Thank you for your letter of October 5, 1989 in the abovecaptioned matter.
I apologize if I have created any confusion in this case. I
answered your inquiries concerning the housing of the Department
of Correctionn and Board of Pardons in this building because that
is what you asked.
You did not make me aware of any concerns
you had about past housing arrangements. Unfortunately I am not
familiar with them, since I only began working in this building
in April and the Department of Corrections and Board of Pardons
had been housed here continuously since some time before that.
I also noticed a typographical error in my August 28, 1989 letter
to you about the present housing arrangements. In paragraph five
the fifth sentence should reads She has H& responsibilities
which would enable her to examine
files or surreptitiously place
materials in them. The wouJ3 MnoM was included in my draft of
that letter, but was inadvertently left off of the final letter
sent out by this office.
If you still feel a new hearing is warranted, your request would
best be directed formally to the Board itself. I am not
empowered to grant or deny this type of request. I personally
have found no evidence of impropriety on the part of the board
and have no reason to impugn their integrity.
With respect to a review of Mr. Foote's file, I would be glad to
as8iBt you in reassuring Mr. Foote that his file is complete. I
have taken the time to review that file (as I have done with Mr.
Jensen's) and would be glad to discuss the types of items which
are contained therein.

Parole board files are classified under the Archives and Records
Services and Informations Practices Act. Some of the information
contained therein is "public," some is "private" and some is
"confidential." See S 63-2-59 et seq. of the Utah Code. Inmates
are not allowed to review their parole files, and.this position
policy has withstood attack in the federal courts. If you are
interested in some case law in this area, see Gerrleh v.
Palacios, 87-C-0826A (D. Utah 1987); affirmed on appeal by the
Tenth Circuit, case no. 88-1443 (March 1, 1989).
Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance in this
area.
Sincerely,

KENT M. BARRY
Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Division
KB/ce

